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Balance-of-Powers Arguments and the Structural Constitution
Eric A. Posner1

Abstract. Balance-of-powers arguments are ubiquitous in judicial opinions and
academic articles that address separation-of-powers disputes over the president’s
removal authority, power to disregard statutes, authority to conduct foreign wars,
and much else. However, the concept of the balance of powers has never received
a satisfactory theoretical treatment. This Essay examines possible theories of the
balance of powers and rejects them all as unworkable and normatively
questionable. Judges and scholars should abandon the balance-of-powers
metaphor and instead address directly whether bureaucratic innovation is likely to
improve policy outcomes.

Introduction
Many scholars believe that the executive branch has become too powerful.
The executive branch is vastly more powerful today than it was at the founding,
and in recent years presidents have made strong claims as to their constitutional
powers, including the power to disregard acts of Congress.2 Yet the courts do not
regard the presidency as too powerful. Courts frequently worry about legislative
encroachment on the presidency, and in disputes between Congress and the
executive see their role as ensuring that neither institution obtains power at the
expense of the other. For the courts, then, the picture is one in which each branch
is constantly seeking to obtain advantages over the other, not one in which the
presidency has overwhelmed Congress.
The central metaphor in cases that feature a clash between the executive
and Congress is the balance of power—the idea that neither branch should be
1
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powerful enough to dominate the other. In American constitutional law, the
metaphor originates, of course, with Madison, and his theory that governments
should be divided into three branches—executive, legislative, and judicial—
which must always remain in balance.3 Although Madison meant all three types
of power must not be held by one branch, and did not suggest the modern idea
that incremental shifts in the balance of power could be unconstitutional,
Madison’s idea is frequently interpreted today to mean that a particular balance
must always be maintained, and that it is the courts’ duty to maintain it.4
But what do courts do when they maintain the balance of power between
the executive and Congress? What does this metaphor mean? The idea, which at
first sight seems geometrically precise, is elusive under close inspection. Power is
famously difficult to define. It is even harder to quantify, or to assign “weights”
to. Does balance of power mean that Congress and the president possess the same
amount of power? What would that mean? Or merely that both branches play a
role in determining policy outcomes (or some policy outcomes)? Or just that one
branch can prevent the other from engaging in abuses (or certain abuses)? Or just
that efforts by one branch to implement policy will be systematically questioned,
criticized, or opposed by the other?
A historical perspective shows just how difficult it is to answer these
questions. Historians agree that the executive is immensely more powerful today
than it was at the founding, while Congress and the judiciary have changed very
little. Does that mean that distribution of power among the branches is
“unbalanced,” and that courts must try to correct it by withdrawing power from
the executive? At various points, notably starting with the New Deal, Congress
delegated enormous powers to the executive branch, so that officials appointed by
the president would be responsible for enacting and enforcing regulations. Did
these delegations weaken Congress by transferring powers to the executive or
strengthen Congress by enhancing its ability to achieve its goals? Technological
change appears to have enhanced the power of the executive relative to that of
Congress, providing it with additional means to gather information, persuade the
public, and enforce the law, while providing few additional benefits to Congress
and the judiciary. Should the courts withdraw power from the executive in order
to compensate for these advantages? Congress has grown in size from 90
members in 1789, to 535 today. Did Congress become more powerful as a
consequence of its greater size, or weaker because of the difficulties of
3
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cooperation among a larger group of people? The party system was not
anticipated by the founders. Is the balance of power upset when government is
unified under one party or unaffected or improved?
For a possible analogy, consider the role that “balance of power” plays in
the theory of international relations.5 Two states can be said to be at balance when
neither is strong enough to conquer the other and hence both refrain from going to
war. The potential benefits from victory are outweighed by the risk of loss and the
costs and losses that must be incurred even if victory is secured. A third country
that seeks to ensure that neither country overwhelms the other can lend military
assistance to whichever country falls behind in an arms race if one does, in this
way maintaining the “balance of powers.” Here, the balance of powers metaphor
is helpful. Another analogy comes from an old constitutional tradition originating
in the ancient world, which reflected anxiety about conflicts between the masses
of ordinary people and the elites. A “balanced” constitution was one that ensured
that neither group was able to take advantage of the other, and conflict between
the two of them was minimized.6 In both analogies, “balance” means peace, either
external or internal, and peace can be observed. By contrast, the executive and
Congress do not try to conquer each other; they do not have territory that can be
held or taken. Nor do they have resources that can be seized. Instead, they
compete to influence public policy outcomes. To determine whether their power
is in balance, one needs a theory as to how they influence those public policy
outcomes, and what it means for their influence to be equivalent. No such theory
has ever been proposed.
In light of the difficulty of defining and measuring power, let alone
determining whether the power of different branches “balances,” one might be
skeptical of the courts’ assertion that their task is to maintain that balance of
power. In Morrison v. Olson, for example, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
the statutory for-cause restriction on the Attorney General’s power to fire an
independent counsel infringed on executive power, but nonetheless upheld the
statute because, in light of other means of controlling the independent counsel at
the president’s disposal, the infringement was not significant.7 By contrast, in
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the
Supreme Court struck down a statute that restricted the president’s ability to fire
members of an administrative body by giving both those members and their
bosses, the SEC Commissioners, for-cause protection.8 Although it is possible
that the executive was weakened more by the dual for-cause protection than by
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the single for-cause protection, the Court did not explain why it believed the
balance of powers was maintained in the second case but not the first.
In this paper, I supply a framework for analyzing claims about the balance
of power between Congress and the executive. I will briefly address the judiciary
as well but in common with the literature I will treat the judiciary as a neutral
adjudicator that is charged with maintaining the balance of power between
Congress and the executive, although this position is unsatisfactory given that the
judiciary, on Madisonian assumptions, can itself encroach on the other branches,
and indeed should be motivated to do so, and thus cannot be considered neutral.
Power is the ability to force people to act differently from how they would
otherwise act, usually by credibly threatening to harm their interests if they do not
act as desired.9 In the context of the U.S. government, one can distinguish two
dimensions of power. Vertical power refers to the power of the government to
coerce citizens.10 Horizontal power refers to the relative vertical power of the
different agents of government, which is conventionally divided into executive,
legislative, and judicial. The executive has maximum horizontal power if it
possesses all the vertical power so that the legislature and judiciary lack the
ability to coerce citizens independently and only the executive can.
The balance of power idea refers to horizontal power, but, as I will argue,
it cannot be understood without reference to vertical power. A skewed balance of
power may be harmless if vertical power is limited; a skewed balance of power
will be dangerous if vertical power is great. One point I will make is that the
debates in the literature on the balance of power are so removed from practical
questions of governance that scholars and courts have lost sight of the social
consequences of their positions on the balance of power.
But my focus is horizontal power, and the notion of balance. I argue that
the balance of power metaphor is not used consistently or even coherently in
judicial opinions and academic articles, although I do not claim that the concept
of balance of powers is incoherent.11 But my main goal is conceptual: to provide a
coherent account of the balance of powers, and how it could play a role in
constitutional adjudication. To do this, I rely on a very simple spatial model,
9
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familiar from the political science literature. The spatial model can be used to
define rigorously what a balance of power could mean in the context of the
separation of powers. I argue that the model reveals clearly what is wrong with
the balance of powers metaphor, and conclude that even the best interpretation of
the balance of powers has nothing to recommend it.
I. The “Balance of Powers” in the Courts and in the Academic Literature
A. The Courts
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act created a new agency called the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, which was given the authority to regulate
accounting firms. The Act lodged the Board in the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and gave the SEC commissioners the power to appoint and
remove the Board members subject to a for-cause standard.12 The SEC
commissioners themselves enjoy independence; the president can also remove
them only for cause. Thus, the Board is protected by a double layer of insulation
from presidential interference: Board members cannot be removed by the
president but only by SEC commissioners for cause, and SEC commissioners can
be removed by the president only for cause.
In Free Enterprise Fund vs. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
the Supreme Court held that this arrangement violated the separation of powers.13
The Court said that although the presidential removal power can be subject to
certain constraints, including for-cause requirements, the dual for-cause limitation
went too far, impermissibly interfering with the executive power to enforce laws.
But how did the dual for-cause limitation go too far? One might take the
position, held by a number of commentators, that any provision that limits the
executive’s power to remove is an impermissible restriction on executive power.
But the Supreme Court has never held that view. In Humphrey’s Executor v.
United States, the Court upheld a statute that provided that the president could not
remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission except with cause.14 In
Morrison v. Olson, the Court upheld a statute that provided that the Attorney
General could not remove independent counsels except with cause, observing
blandly that although the statute no doubt “reduces the amount of control or
supervision that the Attorney General and, through him, the President exercises
over the investigation and prosecution of a certain class of alleged criminal
12
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activity,” the reduction was incremental, because the Attorney General and thus
the president retained various ways of exerting control over the independent
counsel.15 The Court in FEF distinguished these cases on the grounds that the
Board was subject to a dual, rather than single, for-cause limitation, but it did not
explain why, if the incremental restriction on executive power in Humphrey’s
Executor and Morrison was constitutionally acceptable, the additional increment
created by the dual for-cause limitation went too far. Just how far is too far?
The Court did not answer this question. Instead, it fell back on a line of
thinking that, if taken literally, would require that Morrison and Humphrey’s
Executor be overturned:
In fact, the multilevel protection that the dissent endorses “provides a
blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power…..” In a system
of checks and balances, “[p]ower abhors a vacuum,” and one branch’s
handicap is another’s strength. “Even when a branch does not arrogate
power to itself,” therefore, it must not “impair another in the performance
of its constitutional duties.” Congress has plenary control over the salary,
duties, and even existence of executive offices. Only Presidential
oversight can counter its influence. That is why the Constitution vests
certain powers in the President that “the Legislature has no right to
diminish or modify.”16
Echoing Justice Scalia’s complaint in his dissenting opinion in Morrison that “this
statute does deprive the President of substantial control over the prosecutory
functions performed by the independent counsel, and it does substantially affect
the balance of powers,”17 the Court held that the dual for-cause restriction
encroaches on executive power. But the Court did not explain why ebbs and flows
in the relative power of the two branches have been tolerated in the past.
The dissent by Justice Breyer also made no progress with this question:
But even if we put all these other matters to the side, we should still
conclude that the “for cause” restriction before us will not restrict
presidential power significantly. For one thing, the restriction directly
limits, not the President’s power, but the power of an already independent
agency…. But so long as the President is legitimately foreclosed from
removing the Commissioners except for cause (as the majority assumes),
nullifying the Commission’s power to remove Board members only for
cause will not resolve the problem the Court has identified: The President
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will still be “powerless to intervene” by removing the Board members if
the Commission reasonably decides not to do so.18
In this passage and related passages, Justice Breyer argued that the dual for-cause
restriction did not reduce presidential power “significantly;” indeed, it may even
have increased presidential power by giving the president a way to commit not to
interfere with policy choices ex ante where he might change his mind ex post.19
Neither the majority nor the dissent explained how they determined that the
reduction in presidential power was “significant” or not.
The difficulties go deeper than either the majority or dissent admit. One
possibility, as recognized by the majority, is that the law enhances the influence
of Congress at the expense of the president because insulated executive officials
worry more about budget cuts than about being fired. Another possibility is that
the Board’s insulation protects it from the president and Congress, which loses
the ability to demand that the president sack an official who displeases it. If so,
the dual for-cause restriction does not affect the balance of powers. Indeed, the
insulation could strengthen the president’s hand since he can no longer fire
officials that Congress dislikes while he retains the freedom to appoint whoever
he wants.
Both opinions are also curiously silent about another question, which is
what is the baseline for determining when a reduction in presidential power goes
too far? This issue received no attention from the majority or dissent in FEF, and
only the briefest of mentions in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison:
That is what this suit is about. Power. The allocation of power among
Congress, the President, and the courts in such fashion as to preserve the
equilibrium the Constitution sought to establish—so that “a gradual
concentration of the several powers in the same department,” Federalist
No. 51, p. 321 (J. Madison), can effectively be resisted.20
While Scalia appeared to identify the benchmark balance of power as that which
prevailed at the time of the founding, he did not explain what that balance of
power was, that is, who had how much power relative to whom.21 As a result, we
do not know whether the constitutional equilibrium would have prevailed if the
independent counsel statute had been struck down. If the executive had become
too powerful relative to the founding-era baseline, then the statute would have
helped reinstate the proper equilibrium rather than upset it.
18
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The silence in the opinions on the location of the constitutionally
permissible balance of power is striking. The opinions evade this issue by
implicitly taking the status quo at the time that the statute was enacted as the
baseline for comparison. In FEF, the majority argued that the dual for-cause
requirement was unprecedented, while the dissent insisted that it did not differ
meaningfully from restrictions in the statute book.22 In Morrison, the majority
pointed out that the president retains other means for controlling the independent
counsel, while the dissent argued that those other means were not sufficient.23 The
implied baseline in both cases was the status quo balance of power. But why
should the status quo matter? An originalist like Justice Scalia would presumably
believe that the balance of power at the founding should be the constitutional
baseline. Others might take a different position, but few people would argue that
the constitutional balance of powers is whatever the balance of power exists at
any given time. Certainly, no court has explicitly made this claim.
Balance-of-power reasoning in one form or another exists in numerous
other cases involving the separation of powers.24 It also can be found in other
areas of constitutional law, for example, cases involving federalism.25 The
opinions in these cases are no more illuminating than the opinions in FEF and
Morrison.
B. The Academic Literature

22
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With some important exceptions, the academic literature has accepted the
balance-of-powers framework. Cass Sunstein provides a characteristic statement
of this view in the course of criticizing Justice Holmes’ argument that courts
should not adjudicate separation of powers disputes:
In its usual form, it [Holmes’ position] amounts to a wholesale
abandonment of the separation of powers, and its belief in a selfcalibrating institutional equilibrium, based on the supposedly equal power
of the opposing forces, is without historical or theoretical support. There is
good reason to suppose that without adequate controls one branch will
sometimes exercise too much power over the others. One of the purposes
of the Constitution was to prevent that outcome and to check imbalances
when they occur. Acquiescence by one branch to a redistribution of
national powers may not prevent—indeed it may increase—the danger
that the new arrangement will jeopardize some of the purposes that
underlie the constitutional structure.26
To avoid such imbalances, Sunstein favors enabling courts to strike down statutes
that undermine the values protected by the separation of powers.
This type of thinking is often associated with the “functionalist” position
on separation of powers, which holds that judicial enforcement of separation of
powers is designed to maintain a balance of power among the branches. 27 But on
one view, the “formalist” position, according to which each branch must exercise
its characteristic power absent explicit deviations in the Constitution, is ultimately
based on the balance of powers idea as well. The only difference is that the
formalist believes that the founders determined the correct balance for all time by
establishing simple rules that allocate powers, while the functionalist wants to
revisit the balance of powers whenever a dispute among the branches occurs.28
The formalist can plausibly argue that her position allows courts to avoid the
futile task of determining the optimal balance of power every time a challenge
occurs, but the price to be paid for this advantage is that we end up trapped in the
eighteenth-century balance of power that is of little relevance for today, and in
any event no longer prevails.29
Moreover, in order to avoid the charge of irrelevance, some formalists
have relied on an idea roughly similar to the concept of balancing. This is the idea
that the Constitution prohibits “the encroachment or aggrandizement of one
26
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branch at the expense of the other,”30 where “encroachment” means one branch
taking on the essential function of another branch in the absence of textual
authorization. For example, statutory restrictions on the removal power amount to
unconstitutional encroachment because they involve an effort by Congress to
restrict executive power, where the power to remove is assumed to be a feature of
executive power. This approach reintroduces indeterminacy into the formalist
argument, and may be inconsistent with the premises of formalism, as John
Manning has argued.31 But I will not further address this issue and instead will
focus on the balance of powers.
In the academic debate on the independent counsel statute, scholars echo
the majority and dissent in Morrison, arguing back and forth as to whether the
statute took too much power from the executive and gave too much power to
Congress. Abner Greene argues:
There is, though, a justification for the Morrison result that is perfectly
consonant with the original balance of powers theme, with the framers’
concern with corruption and self-dealing within any branch of
government. The Ethics in Government Act can be seen as intruding into
executive power precisely when executive power fails to operate—when
the executive has, in effect, exempted itself from the execution of the
laws.32
On this view, the framers envisioned an original balance of powers in which the
executive’s power to dominate other branches of government was in part balanced
by Congress’ power to enact laws that constrain it. President Nixon’s presidency
became too powerful when he refused to enforce the laws that executive officials
had broken. The independent counsel statute restored this balance by creating a
mechanism that ensures enforcement when the president’s interests are at stake.
By contrast, Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo argue:
permitting Congress to place limits on the President’s removal power
threatens to upset the Madisonian conception of the separation of powers,
which envisions all three branches constantly engaged in a state of
dynamic tension. By reducing the President's role in this balance,

30
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limitations on the removal power inevitably tip the balance in Congress’s
favor.33
Calabresi and Yoo argue that in Clinton v. New York, in which the Court
invalidated the line-item veto, the Court’s holding reflected the view that “Even
though Congress had voluntarily surrendered its own power and had acted out of
the laudable desire to eliminate pork-barrel politics and reduce government
spending, the change still would have taken the legislative branch out of this
process of dynamic tension that the Framers regarded as the best safeguard for
liberty.”34 But this is not true. The legislative branch would have remained in the
“process,” as it must enact legislation before the president can veto line items.
Similarly, in Morrison the executive remains in the “process” of removing
officials or controlling the bureaucracy even if his decisions are restricted by the
“for cause” rule.
It is clear that the two sides of the debate simply differ in their assessment
as to whether the independent counsel weakens the president or not, or possibly
whether any weakening of the president is justified by public policy
considerations, including those underlying the theory of the separation of powers.
Because they do not offer empirical evidence, or even allude to the type of
empirical evidence that could resolve their disagreement, the debate is fruitless.
Scholars make similar balance-of-power arguments about the other types
of clashes between Congress and the executive, including the disputes over the
legislative veto,35 delegation of power to the executive branch,36 the establishment
of special tribunals,37 the line-item veto,38 executive dominance of foreign
relations,39 sentencing guidelines,40 judicial deference to agency interpretations,41
33
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and the impact of the party system on the structure of government. 42 A number of
recent articles and books claim that the Bush administration expanded executive
power at the expense of Congress.43 Many other examples can be invoked.44 All
of these arguments are variations on the theme that the executive (or in some
cases Congress) has overreached, upsetting the balance of power, and the other
branches should assert themselves more aggressively, so as to rebalance the
distribution of power. But in none of these case are authors able to show that the
balance of power was “upset;” only that one branch gained at the expense of
another branch (and even these claims are disputed), not that the gain was
excessive. Moreover, there is rarely attention to how an advantage in one area (for
example, the invalidation of the legislative veto, which favored the executive)
might be counterbalanced by a disadvantage in another area (for example,
approval of restrictions on removal, which favored Congress),45 or for that matter
how changes in purely formal powers are affected by general political
considerations like the temporary popularity of the president after a successful
war or unpopularity after a random gaffe or scandal.
Only a few scholars have questioned the logic of the balance of powers.46
A number of papers have addressed the empirical accuracy of its premises.47 Sai
41
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(Chicago 2009). For the contrary view, see Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The
Accountable Presidency After 9/11 (Norton 2012).
44
See, e.g., Rachel Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 989
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Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 Ala. L. Rev. 689 (2006) (arguing that Congress has
delegated excessive power to the judiciary by transferring authority to agencies which the
judiciary supervises); Victoria F. Nourse & John P. Figura, Toward a Representational Theory of
the Executive: Review of The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush,
91 B.U.L. Rev. 273 (2011) (arguing that the unitary executive theory provides the executive with a
means for increasing its power); Neal Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s
most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L. J. 2314 (2006) (trying to recreate separation of
powers within the executive branch).
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But for an exception, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7
Game, 80 Geo. L.J. 523 (1992), discussed below.
46
To be sure, many scholars have raised questions about whether the system of separation of
powers produces good outcomes relative to other possible systems such as parliamentarianism.
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633 (2000); Adrian
Vermeule, The Invisible Hand in Legal and Political Theory, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1417 (2010). But my
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Prakash criticized the balance-of-powers idea in part on the basis of its
indeterminacy.48 And Elizabeth Magill subsequently advanced several cogent
criticisms of the balance of powers in an article devoted to dismembering the
concept.49 Magill argued that balance of powers arguments are fatally flawed
because (1) it is impossible to determine the extent to which any statute or action
affects the balance of power; (2) we lack a normative benchmark for evaluating
claims about the balance of power; and (3) the branches are composed of
individuals who represent diverse constituencies, so that a balance among
different groups of the public can exist even if a branch dominates governance.50
Although I share Magill’s skepticism, I believe that her criticisms go too
far, and the kitchen-sink scope of her argument may have limited its influence.51
It is possible to provide a conceptually coherent account of the balance of power,
and even to claim that one can, in a conceptually coherent way, compare the
balance of power created by a statute with some benchmark, constitutionally
proper balance of power. However, once one achieves this conceptual clarity—
and that is the goal of this paper—it becomes clear that the skepticism underlying
Magill’s argument is correct: the balance of power is both normatively suspect
and almost impossible to apply in a systematic matter for the purpose of
approving or rejecting legal innovations in administrative structure.

II. Evaluating Claims about Horizontal Power
A. The Baseline Problem
To criticize the existing distribution of power, one must show that it
deviates from a constitutional baseline. But what is that baseline, and how does
one compare the existing distribution to that baseline?
but observes that there is no reason to believe that the temporary occupants of the branches will
internalize goals of institutional aggrandizement. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes,
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311, 2356 (2006), argue that separation of
powers can serve its balancing function only when the government is divided on a partisan basis.
48
See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Deviant Executive Lawmaking, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1,
46-47 (1998) (arguing that balance-of-powers arguments do not help resolve constitutionality of
line-item veto); see also Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112
Colum. L. Rev. 507, 572-73 (2012) (arguing that balance-of-powers arguments does not help
resolve the constitutionality of the executive’s duty to defend statutes). Prakash’s main objection
to the balance of powers doctrine is that, in his view, it has no basis in the constitutional text.
49
See Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 603 (2001). The criticism was made even earlier by Jeremy Bentham. See Bentham, supra
note __, at 163-67, and by various lesser observers and commentators in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. See Vile, supra note __, at 127-28.
50
See Magill, supra note __, at 608–626, 633, 645–649.
51
Although her article has been cited a fair number of times, it has not dammed the flow of
balance-of-power arguments in the scholarly literature or the courts.
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To answer this question, let us use detention as our running example. A
terrorist attack occurs, and the president claims the power to detain suspected
terrorists without trial. Congress and the courts object. After a number of adverse
judicial decisions, Congress enacts a law that gives suspected terrorists limited
procedural protections, which the president signs. Courts approve this
compromise legislation.
The ideal points of the three agents can be depicted along a line, as is
standard with political science models.52
___________________
SQ
J
C
P
SQ represents the status quo, which we will assume is a rule that suspected
criminals (including suspected terrorists) are entitled to full due process rights. J
represents the ideal point of the Court; C represents the ideal point of Congress;
and P represents the ideal point of the president. As one moves right along the
line, the level of procedural protections for suspected terrorists declines. So we
assume initially that the Court is willing to relax these protections, but not as
much as Congress, which in turn is not willing to relax the protections as much as
the president is. These ideal points are hypothetical only; it is conceivable that the
preferences of the agents follow a different order, now or at any other time.
A policy outcome can also be depicted as a point, X, on the line. In the
example, X represents the level of procedural protection that is ultimately granted
to suspected terrorists. X could end up anywhere on the line—at SQ, for example,
if the branches are unable to change the law; or at, say, halfway between C and P,
if the new law is a compromise between Congress’ and the president’s ideal
points; or at P, if the president alone determines policy.53
Thus, it is easy to use a quantitative representation of the extent to which a
political agent’s preferences are embodied in the policy outcome. It is simply the
difference between the value of X and the value of the agent’s ideal point, which
we will designate Di, where i={Court, Congress, and president}. A lower score is
better for the agent in question, as it means that the difference between the policy
outcome and its ideal point is smaller. If, for convenience, we treat SQ=0, J=1,
52

For examples of their use to discuss separation of powers issues, see Terry M. Moe and William
G. Howell, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory, 29 Presidential Stud. Q. 850,
856–858 (1999); Jeffrey A. Segal, Chad Westerland, & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Congress, the
Supreme Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model, 55
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 89, 93–95 (2011).
53
Where X lands could depend on purely formal considerations (for example, the president’s veto,
Congress’s power to enact bills, and so forth) or political considerations (for example, Congress
may not oppose a popular president because of the political costs). I bracket these issues here.
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C=2, and P=3, and the policy outcome X turns out to be 2.5, halfway between C
and P, then we get the following results. For the Court, the payoff is 1.5; for
Congress and the president, the payoff is 0.5. (In symbols, Dj=1.5; Dc=0.5;
Dp=0.5.) Their lower scores show that Congress and the president have greater
influence on the policy outcome than the judiciary does.
If we know or can estimate the ideal points of each agent and the policy
outcome, we can measure the extent of the power or influence of each agent over
any particular policy dimension. The next step would be to aggregate over policy
outcomes. One view might be that if the president is powerful in one dimension
(say, foreign relations) but Congress is powerful in another dimension (say, tax
rate), then the balance of power is satisfied even though each branch may look too
powerful from the narrower focus. Another view is that we do not want such
power imbalances in any policy dimension, in which case we would argue that
Congress should have more power over foreign policy, and the president should
have more power over tax rates. But let us put these (possibly insuperable)
difficulties aside. The question now is, What does it mean to say that the president
or any other branch is powerful or too powerful? I can think of three possibilities.
First, we might stipulate that an agent is powerful if it always gets its way,
or conversely that the agent is not powerful if it does not always get its way. In
other words, the president is powerful if in all (or some significant number of)
cases, Dp=0; or, conversely, the president is not powerful if Dp>0. A minimalist
version of Madison might reflect this approach: at a minimum, all three branches
must participate in determining policy outcomes, and so the policy outcomes must
reflect a compromise of the ideal points of all three branches.
The obvious problem with this approach is that we might consider the
president far too powerful even if he does not always get his way. But it is at least
clear that merely pointing out that in some instances the president did not achieve
his ideal point is not sufficient to prove that the president does not possess
excessive power.54
Indeed, any formulaic or axiomatic approach to establishing a baseline test
of constitutional horizontal power will be hard to defend. Consider the possibility
that an optimal “checks and balances” approach would require that, on average,
Dj = Dc = Dp. This would mean that any given policy outcome X would on
average reflect the equal influence of each branch. This is functionally equivalent
to a system in which the three agents governed a country in a troika where
decisions were all made by unanimity (or possibly majority depending on the
structure of the agents’ preferences). But there is no particular reason to believe
that such a distribution of power would be the right one.
54

See Part V.A., below.
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Second, we might use a historical baseline. One such baseline is the
distribution of power that existed during the founding.55 One could also use a
modern baseline, perhaps one that by consensus responds to modern conditions or
needs: say, the distribution of power as it existed during Theodore Roosevelt’s
administration (arguably, the birth of the modern presidency), or FDR’s (the birth
of the modern administrative state), or, say, Reagan’s (the rebirth of the
presidency after the temporary loss of confidence in the office caused by the
Watergate scandal). The founding-era baseline might have certain legitimacy,
reflecting a clear constitutional commitment; a modern-era baseline would be
more realistic, although intensely controversial. In any event, using the historical
baseline approach, we could stipulate that an agent’s power is legitimate if its Di
today is roughly equivalent to its Di at the relevant historical baseline.
This approach faces numerous hurdles as well. One would need to explain
why one historical period should be used as the baseline rather than another, and
there is no consensus on what historical period should be used. Doing
comparisons over different historical periods—especially if the baseline period
occurred long in the past such as the founding—would be almost impossible.
What was the distribution of power across the branches during the founding era?
How would one measure it? There is also a kind of second-best problem.
Suppose, as has sometimes been claimed, that Congress is weaker than at the
founding but that both the president and the courts are stronger. This new
equilibrium may be better from the standpoint of the public interest than one in
which the original equilibrium prevailed. And it is not clear that courts could
weaken the president without making themselves stronger, thus upsetting the
balance in a new way with a strong judiciary and Congress but weak executive.
Finally, if one historical period is chosen as the baseline, it will freeze a
distribution of power in place that may not be appropriate for future periods
(putting aside constitutional amendment, which is extremely difficult). The
distribution of power today or at some time in the past is unlikely to be optimal
for any given point in the future.
Third, we might set our baseline with reference to a conception of the
public interest or social welfare. For example, we might argue that the distribution
of power at any time should be whatever distribution of power advances the
public interest or maximizes social welfare or some other criterion of social wellbeing. Thus, it is always available to the president to argue that his latest seizure
of power is legitimate because it advances the public interest. For example, Bush
could argue that he needed to obtain the power to detain terrorism suspects
because under the previous distribution of power the president was unable to
protect the United States adequately from foreign attack. His opponents would
55
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need to argue that the accretion of presidential power would create a risk of abuse
greater than any benefits.
The major attraction of this approach is that it provides a normative basis
for arguing about the distribution of power. By contrast, the first and second
approaches provide an arbitrary or insufficiently defended normative baseline.
And many public debates do have the character of being simultaneously about
optimal policy and the optimal institutional structure for achieving the best policy.
Thus, conservatives today argue for a strong president in national security areas
but a somewhat weaker president (or government) for domestic affairs, probably
on the basis of policy goals rather than strong normative commitments about
institutional structure. Conservatives and liberals alike constantly renegotiate
institutional structures in light of changing conceptions of the public interest.
The problem here is that the social welfare function is not observable;
what is good for the country is the subject of constant debate. 56 Moreover, the
relationship between institutions and social welfare (or any other normative
standard) is extremely ambiguous, and itself subject to intense debate. For
example, conservatives argue that a strong presidency is needed to protect the
country from terrorist attacks; liberals disagree. The ultimate source of
disagreement may simply be that conservatives think that the terrorist threat is
greater than liberals do, or that the harm from a terrorist threat is greater, or that
the risk to civil liberties from a strong presidency is less or less important.
Constitutional norms, as embodied in institutional structures, are supposed to
make governance easier by delegating the power to electoral winners to
implement normative goals. If every public policy debate becomes a debate about
institutional structure, policy-making becomes cumbersome, maybe impossible.
In sum, because it is difficult both to identify the constitutional baseline
for horizontal power and to rigorously characterize it, all claims that presidential
power has violated or stayed consistent with that baseline will be difficult to
evaluate.
B. The Measurement Problem
To measure an agent’s power, one needs three pieces of information: the
location of the status quo, the location of X, and the location of the agent’s ideal

56

Compare similar sorts of arguments about corporate governance. At least in principle we can
test theories of corporate governance by doing event studies that relate a particular change in the
distribution of power between corporate officers, directors, and shareholders, and stock price. Here
we have a relatively uncontroversial normative baseline in stock price, and we can do empirical
tests because thousands of corporations exist. Along these two dimensions, the evaluation of
separation of powers is lacking.
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points. Of these three pieces of information, the second two create difficulties that
require additional comment.
How does one determine the location of the policy outcome? Consider the
suggestion that after 9/11, the status quo policy of granting due process to
suspected terrorists was abandoned in favor of a rule that gave them more limited
due process—approximately the right to access to the D.C. federal courts for the
purpose of presenting exculpatory evidence and to some extent challenging
inculpatory evidence as to whether one satisfies the definition of enemy
combatant.57 The policy outcome is different from the status quo outcome because
the government has announced a different legal rule.
Another approach is to look at actual outcomes: the extent to which a
particular suspect is given opportunities and resources to defend herself. Of
course, any single suspect might receive special treatment or especially bad
treatment because of unique circumstances, politics, the breakdown of
institutional safeguards, and the like. Thus, we should look at aggregate
outcomes. We might, for example, compare how members of Al Qaeda are
treated in comparison to various control groups—including suspected terrorists
unaffiliated with Al Qaeda, and suspected members of Al Qaeda before 9/11, that
is, before the policy had been implemented. If there is no difference, then the
policy outcome has not changed. If there is, it has.
Both of these approach pose difficulties. As for the first, although it is
clear that the government can detain members of Al Qaeda on weaker evidence
than it can use to convict someone of a crime, the extent of the difference depends
on how courts interpret the rule. The courts could give the government the benefit
of the doubt, or the detainee the benefit of the doubt. It is thus hard to quantify the
magnitude of the change based only on a policy statement. And yet looking at
aggregate outcomes does not solve the problem. It is not clear how one translates
the various facts—such-and-such detainees who allegedly engaged in such-andsuch acts—into a point on a line.
Determining the location of the agents’ ideal points is also difficult. It is
tempting to argue that, for example, President Bush’s ideal point was a policy that
permitted him to detain anyone suspected of terrorism without any legal
constraint. But the truth is more complicated. Initially, we should distinguish
Bush’s personal ideal point, which expresses his ideological preferences, and a
constructed ideal point, which reflects the various political pressures that
constrain his freedom of action. If all that the president cares about is reelection,
then he will never act to maximize his personal ideal point, and for all intents and
purposes his ideal point reflects those of various constituencies. Note further that
57
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these constituencies may shift. The ideal point is nothing so simple as the median
Republican voter, for example; it might reflect the pivotal voter in a particular
swing state like Pennsylvania or Ohio, or important donors to the president or the
Republican party, or Republican politicians to whom the president owes political
debts.58
Adding to the ambiguity, the president will not necessarily (or even ever)
reveal his ideal point (or even be sure about what it is). Typically, politicians, like
business people and indeed people in all walks of life, exaggerate their bargaining
position so as to extract concessions from counterparties. Bush might have sought
much more power than he wanted or thought he needed, or thought that his own
constituents would support—because he understood that Congress would push
back (and possibly his constituents would understand this), or because he sought
to mollify extremists in his party while aiming to achieve the goals of his more
moderate supporters.
In addition, a president may make concessions in one policy area in order
to obtain his goals in another area. For example, President Obama may have given
up trying to close Guantanamo Bay because he preferred to obtain congressional
support for his health care law and stimulus package.59 To compare his power and
that of Congress, one must know how close this joint policy outcome is to the
president’s two ideal points, and the same for Congress. But because the branches
may be trading policy outcomes in many different dimensions at the same time—
budget, tax level, foreign policy, etc.—it will often be difficult or perhaps
impossible to determine which agent has the most influence on aggregate policy
outcomes.
In sum, to determine the relative power of Congress and the president, one
must identify their ideal points, the location of the status quo, and the location of a
policy outcome, and yet determining the location of all of these points seems
nearly impossible. One might reasonably assert that the current policy is stronger
or weaker than the status quo policy, and possibly that it more closely
approximates the ideal point of one branch than the other, but any kind of precise
measurement or determination will be unavoidably elusive.
C. Selection Problems
The analysis so far has assumed away a number of complications related
to the selection of officeholders. As an illustration, consider the claim that the
president has gained power relative to Congress but has lost power to the
judiciary, so on net presidential power has not increased. But the president selects
58
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members of the judiciary, albeit subject to two constraints—he must wait for
judges to retire, and his selection is subject to Senate confirmation, which may be
a greater or lesser constraint on his freedom of choice. At one extreme, if the
president can select a substantial portion of the judiciary, or even just a single
Supreme Court justice if that justice is a pivotal voter, and further he is able to
select judges who are loyal to him, then the advance of judicial power at the
expense of Congress (if such is the case) has actually strengthened the president’s
hand, not weakened it.
This logic can be extended in various directions. A popular president may
be able to influence the composition of Congress by distributing campaign funds
to favored candidates, endorsing them, and helping them campaign. It is possible
that Congress could end up doing the president’s bidding, even without any overt
demand on his part, so what commentators might see as autonomous
congressional policy choices are in fact the choices of the president. Conversely,
it is possible that important members of Congress, party leaders, and other
officials play a large role in determining who will be elected president, in which
case the president’s actions, however autonomous they may seem, actually reflect
the interests of Congress. Bush v. Gore60 shows that the judiciary also can play a
role in the selection of the president.
Or consider Levinson and Pildes’ argument that Madisonian separation of
powers serves its checking function only when government is divided. 61 Suppose
that Democrats control the presidency and both houses of Congress. It is possible
that the Democratic president, as party leader, dictates policy to Congress, or
Congress dictates policy to the presidency, or some group of Democratic notables
dictate policy to both. In any event, the two branches will not check each other in
the Madisonian sense. In the Levinson/Pildes view, the horizontal distribution of
powers is hostage to the fortunes of the two parties.
These factors play havoc with the spatial analysis above. The reason is
that an agent’s ideal point is at least partly endogenous: it reflects larger political
forces, including the (possibly endogenous) ideal points of other agents. These
concerns are reflected in generally older worries that the president may be the
figurehead of Congress or Congress may be the plaything of the president. Thus,
if the president and Congress agree on a policy outcome X, it may not be because
the two agents have different ideal points and compromise. It may be because one
agent ensures that an agent with the identical ideal point is selected for another
branch.
Claims about the rise or decline of presidential power must take into
account this problem. If the president does some act X that is normally
60
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accomplished by Congress, the reason may simply be that Congress has selected a
president that serves its interests, and so does not need to do the act itself. The
president is not powerful; he is a figurehead. But if Congress appears to act on its
own, it is possible that it is acting in the interest of the president because he has
selected pivotal voters in Congress. The president is not weak; he is the puppet
master behind the scenes who does not even have to issue threats or directions in
order to get his way.
The upshot is that even if one can in various cases conclude that a policy
outcome better approximates the ideal point of one branch or the other, one
cannot necessarily conclude much about whether the balance of powers has
operated in a desirable fashion. Suppose, for example, that the policy outcome
falls exactly between the ideal point of the president and Congress, and suppose,
further, that we believe that such an exact division of influence is entailed by the
balance of power rightly understood. Yet if the president has managed to shift the
ideal point of Congress in his direction by manipulating or influencing Congress’s
membership, then the ideal point is in fact closer to the president than some
hypothetical “real” congressional ideal point that would have existed in the
absence of his interference. This suggests that the balance of power should
depend on hypothetical rather than real ideal points, but there does not seem any
way to derive those hypothetical ideal points from either political theory or
empirical observation. In the effort to maintain balance among the branches, one
loses sight of political context in which they operate.

III. Vertical Power: The Technology of Power
It has been said that although Hobbes believed in absolute power for the
sovereign, the Hobbesian monarch could not pose a significant threat to civil
liberties because the seventeenth century government lacked the means to control
most people. Whether or not this claim is true, it suggests an important
complication that confronts anyone who tries to compare the current distribution
of powers with some earlier baseline case.
Computers and video technology did not exist in the eighteenth century;
they do today. Both then and now, the executive formally has the power to
observe people in public spaces so as to ensure that they do not commit crimes or
cause disorder. However, computers and video technology make it easier for the
executive to observe people in public spaces. And although these technologies
have also made it easier for people to resist observation and control (for example,
they can send encrypted email messages to each other), it seems on balance that
governments can exert greater control over populations today than they could in
the past.
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Vertical power matters to the horizontal-powers debate because in that
debate participants argue in large part over whether excessive horizontal power on
the part of the president enables him to engage in abuse. If it turns out that vertical
power is low, however, then the president cannot engage in abuse even if he
monopolizes horizontal power. Conversely, if vertical power is much greater than
in the past, then it matters more than in the past how horizontal powers are
allocated.
To illustrate these points, let us return to our spatial model:
M
M’
———————————
SQ
J
C
P
The model now shows two possible outcomes, M and M’, which I will call policy
maximums for reasons I will shortly explain. Vertical power refers to the range of
policy outcomes available to the agents. Suppose that at some initial time,
technology permits a policy outcome anywhere in the range from the status quo to
M. Then technology changes, and the range increases to M’. Vertical power has
increased because now it is possible for the political agents to choose an outcome
farther from the status quo than they did before. In this example, the change in
technology increases the vertical power of the presidency only if the president can
choose policy outcomes. If he must compromise with Congress, then even after
the technological change, the political outcome will be located at M, the point at
which Congress and the president can agree, no different from the point at which
they could agree prior to the technological change.62
Increases in vertical power do not necessarily benefit the president at the
expense of Congress. In many cases, increases in vertical power will benefit
whichever agent has the more extreme preferences, assuming that that agent has
enough horizontal power to implement those preferences. However, one can
imagine ways in which technological changes uniquely benefit one branch. For
example, it is possible that communication technology gives horizontal as well as
vertical power to the president because the president is in a better position than
Congress or the courts to use that technology to enhance his influence over the
public.
Many critics of the imperial presidency make just this point: because
vertical power has increased, the increase in the president’s horizontal power
creates a greater risk of abuse than ever before, even in eras (such as the Civil
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War) when the president had significant horizontal power.63 “Abuse” is not
always clearly defined—commentators often seem to have in mind violations of
civil liberties. From the standpoint of our model, we will define “abuse” to mean
political outcomes that differ excessively from the normatively desirable outcome,
such as the preference of the median voter or, more vaguely, the “public interest.”
How should such a claim be evaluated?
The main problem with this claim is the sheer difficulty of comparing the
level of presidential (or government) power in the past and the level today.
Suppose, for example, we decided to reduce the power of the president to what it
was in the eighteenth century. Would that mean depriving the executive branch of
computer technology? Of advanced weapons? Of telephones? Of ballpoint pens?
Of course, as noted, the people whom the government seeks to control have also
benefited from technological advances, which enable them to resist government
control, so it would certainly go too far to limit the government to eighteenth
century technology. But then what level of technology would be appropriate? Or,
if we permit the government to use more efficient modern technology but put
limits on how it is to be used, what should these limits be? These questions are
impossible to answer; they may even be meaningless.
The post 9/11 debates illustrate these problems. Critics objected to the
government’s various efforts to monitor communications by suspected terrorists,
including telephone and email communications.64 These efforts to monitor were
more intrusive than in the recent past, when the government did not monitor these
types of communications at all or without a warrant. Thus, there seemed to be an
identifiable increase in the executive’s power over ordinary people, enabling the
executive to engage in abusive types of monitoring that had been outside its
capabilities. Yet the counterargument was that these technologies gave suspected
terrorists new and more powerful and secure ways to communicate with each
other, thus making them less susceptible to government control than they had
been in the past. Other technological advances, including the miniaturization of
weapons systems also gave terrorists greater power to cause harm. Ordinary
people also had more secure and efficient ways to communicate than they had
before. It is simply not clear whether the government’s exploitation of technology
after 9/11 increased its power at the expense of the public, or reversed a trend in
the direction of excessive government weakness.
Unless we can determine the change in vertical power, we cannot evaluate
claims that the increase in the president’s horizontal power (supposing that has
occurred) has created new risks of abuse of executive power. Yet it is
63
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questionable that we can say, with any degree of rigor, the extent to which vertical
power has changed and created new opportunities for abuse.

IV. Implications: Revisiting Claims About Presidential Power
A. Are Recent “Imperial Presidency” Claims Meaningless?
1. The History of Executive Power
Most debates about presidential power in the legal literature focus on the
horizontal aspect of it and ignore the vertical aspect of it. Scholars obsess over
whether the president has taken too much power from Congress or vice versa, but
rarely discuss whether the government as such has gained too much power over
the people. Yet Madisonian opposition to concentration of horizontal power in
one branch reflected the fear of “tyranny,” the abuse of people’s rights, which
could take place only if the government possessed sufficient vertical power.65 If
the government lacks sufficient vertical power, concentration of horizontal power
in one branch cannot result in tyranny.
Fears about government tyranny can be found outside the legal literature.
Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s argument that the advance of vertical power, along with
its concentration in the executive branch, has produced an “imperial presidency”
is the most famous example, although Schlesinger did not think that tyranny had
actually arrived but was just over the horizon.66 During the Bush administration, a
number of journalists and legal scholars picked up on this theme.67
But is it true that presidential power—both horizontal and vertical—has
increased since the founding? There is no way to observe and hence measure
power directly; the best we can do is use some proxies. As a rough proxy of
vertical executive power, consider the percentage of the population who are
employed by the executive. Figure 1 shows that this percentage increased
permanently during the FDR administration, but it has flattened out and even
declined slightly over the last fifty years.
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One might make the further point that since the executive spends virtually the
entire budget, the ratio of budget to GDP may be another rough proxy for
executive or at least governmental power. Figure 2 provides the data.
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Two observations can be made about these graphs. First, vertical
presidential power—measured in terms of employment and budget—has, if the
proxies are accurate, increased since the founding. Second, however, the advance
of vertical power since the New Deal is not as clear. In terms of employment by
the executive branch, presidential power has declined from its highest point
during the New Deal. In terms of budget, there has been little movement since the
1970s once one excludes the spike attributable to the financial crisis and recession
in 2008 and 2009. The graphs provide little support for the view that every
incremental advance in executive power enables the executive to accumulate still
more.68 A more accurate account is that a radical advance in executive power took
place during the New Deal, and perhaps a smaller increase during the Great
Society era of the 1960s, but otherwise has leveled off.
Figure 3 depicts the percentage of government workers who are employed
in the executive branch (as opposed to Congress and the judiciary). This is a
rough proxy for horizontal power.
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The data suggest that the executive gained power at the expense of the other
branches, not during the New Deal but (putting aside the temporary spike during
the Civil War) at the time of Teddy Roosevelt.
We can obtain another perspective on the relative power of the presidency
and Congress by comparing the amount of “law” that is produced by each. The
founders expected Congress to make the law, and the president to enforced. But in
the modern administrative state, the executive branch makes law through
regulation on the basis of its delegated powers. Figure 4 compares the lawmaking
activity of Congress and the executive since 1936 by depicting total pages per
year in the U.S. Code and total pages per year in the Federal Register. 69 Like our
other measures, these measures are extremely crude, but they are nonetheless
helpful for seeing how the president’s influence has increases. The first Federal
Register volume appeared in 1936; before then, the executive engaged in
regulation but much less than before the New Deal. The president’s regulatory
power then increased at roughly the same rate as Congress’s, until the 1960s,
when the president’s regulatory power began increasing at a significantly faster
rate. In absolute terms, the graph also confirms the widely held view that the
national government has gained tremendous (vertical) power since early in the
twentieth century.
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Finally, in Figure 5 we compare the growth of congressional-executive
agreements relative to treaties. Presidents make treaties with the approval of two
thirds of the Senate, whereas congressional-executive agreements require a
majority in each house. Although congressional participation is required in both
cases, a president who has access to both methods for entering treaties is more
powerful than a president who must persuade two thirds of the Senate to join him,
and thus the rise of the congressional-executive agreement is yet another piece of
evidence about the increase in presidential power.70 It is evident that, based on
this proxy, presidential power increased from the 1930s through the 1970s, but
then tailed off.
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“Sole” executive agreements, where the executive enters into international agreements without
the approval of either house of Congress, provide another proxy for executive power. However, I
have not found reliable data on these agreements.
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These five figures rest on empirical data that are at best rough proxies for
the power, and can give us no more than rough impressions about trends. Still,
they are better than no evidence at all. They are consistent with each other, and
with the conventional view that the executive has gained both vertical and
horizontal power over the course of American history, and in particular during the
first half of the twentieth century, but provide no support for alarmist claims that
executive power has reached new heights in the last decade.71
2. Recent Claims about the Imperial Presidency
During the Bush administration, many critics of the presidency argued that
Bush had “aggrandized” executive power, defying Congress in ways that his
predecessors had not.72 Bush defined a private criminal organization as a
belligerent, ordered military forces to kill members of that organization without
judicial process and detain them without charges, refused to comply with the laws
of war with respect to lawful combatants in Afghanistan, and authorized torture
and wiretapping. Many if not all of these acts violated statutes. Bush also drew on
71
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(last accessed 09/27/2012);
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a broad interpretation of his commander-in-chief powers to justify disregarding
statutes that he did not agree with.
Many commentators gave special attention to torture. Congress passed the
Anti-Torture Statute in 1994, which in plain terms prohibits anyone from
engaging in torture.73 The Bush administration nonetheless authorized “enhanced
interrogation techniques,” including waterboarding, which by any definition
amounts to torture. These techniques were used against at least three detainees,
and possibly more.74 Thus, it appears that the executive flagrantly disregarded the
will of Congress. The balance of powers broke down.
By contrast, Jack Goldsmith points out that the Bush administration
authorized these techniques only after extensive legal analysis, and time and again
faced constraints from outside the executive branch.75 The CIA ensured that
various executive branch institutions endorsed, or at least gave silent
acquiescence to, coercive interrogation. CIA officials made a presentation to
members of the House and Senate intelligence committees. After the program was
put into effect and information about it leaked out, various members of the
public—journalists, lawyers, politicians—raised a hue and cry. The Bush
administration was forced to ask inspectors general to evaluate the program—and
in doing so, used a mechanism put into place by Congress in the Inspectors
General Act. Congress also passed a new law that banned torture. The Bush
administration stopped using waterboarding in 2007,76 and the Obama
administration has repudiated it as well.77 Although Goldsmith’s account of
“pushback” against presidential power relies to a large extent on ordinary politics,
he gives some credit to Congress, and suggests that the system of separation of
powers prevailed.78
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How can one rigorously evaluate this debate? Goldsmith puts a great deal
of weight on process, emphasizing the ways in which executive branch officials
took account of the law even while attempting to circumvent it. But the critics are
not concerned with process but with outcomes.
To address the issue rigorously, one would need to identify the ideal point
of Congress, the ideal point of the executive, and the location of the policy
outcome—sporadic torture. We immediately run into numerous problems. Do we
use the ideal point of Congress at the time that it passed the Anti-Torture Statute
or the ideal point of Congress at the time of the conflict over torture? Is the ideal
point of Congress that of the median voter (in the House, the Senate?), the
leadership, or some voting bloc? Do we use the public preferences of Congress or
the hidden preferences represented by the committee members who did not object
to the interrogation techniques? Did Congress’s ideal point change over time in
response to developments in public opinion?
The questions are scarcely less difficult to answer when we turn to the
executive. Is the ideal point some personal or ideological preference of Bush
himself, or his judgment as to the optimal political position to take in response to
pressure from voters, or a point that reflects a compromise among the views of
different people and institutions in the executive branch? Even if it were that of
Bush himself, how can we identify his ideal point? Should we use a public
statement or wait for archival records to appear, or acknowledge that we have no
idea—he may have wanted to torture as many suspects as possible, or he may
have wanted to reserve the use of torture for just the worst cases?
We cannot answer these questions with any confidence, but they at least
enable us to see how much uncertainty there is as to the issue of whether the
executive encroached on the power of Congress. It is possible that the acts of
torture were preferred by Congress, at least in the early years; it is even possible
that they went beyond what Bush wanted. We simply do not know.
Then there is the question whether the outcome, which at least on
Goldsmith’s account reflected the power of both branches, reflected a
constitutionally valid balance of power. Here again we face considerable
uncertainty. The question is not so much whether George Washington could have
authorized torture (which he never did) in violation of a statute (which did not
exist at that time). It is whether Washington’s influence on relevant policy
outcomes was similar to that of George W. Bush. The question seems impossible
to answer. And as noted before, there is not even agreement as to whether the
founding-era balance of power should be the constitutional baseline, and if not,
which era’s balance of power should be.
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As if to prove the elasticity of the concept of power, today conservatives
who defended Bush’s use of power have come to the conclusion that Obama is the
“imperial president.”79 They point to his decision not to enforce the immigration
laws against certain young people who lack immigration papers, to use waivers to
undermine the No Child Left Behind law, and to launch a military intervention in
Libya without congressional authorization. Obama has also maintained most of
the features of Bush’s approach to counterterrorism, expanding the drone program
under which the executive branch determines who will be killed overseas,
including American citizens. Obama has not cited his constitutional powers as
enthusiastically as Bush did, but Obama’s lawyers have also not repudiated the
Article II theory, and could draw on it if they believed it necessary.
But the ambiguity of the constitutional baseline also makes it difficult to
compare the horizontal power of Bush and Obama. I see no way to evaluate
claims that a recent president has violated the Constitution by seizing or
exercising disproportionate power—though it is easy imagine extreme cases
(shutting down Congress, for example) where such a judgment would be
plausible.
B. Doctrinal Controversies
A large number of doctrinal controversies involve scholars and judges
arguing that a particular rule gives the president (or Congress) too much or too
little power relative to the other. The debates involve such questions as whether
the executive can refuse to enforce the law;80 whether Congress can control the
president’s management of military operations81 or foreign relations more
generally;82 whether the president enjoys emergency powers that allow him to
disregard statutes during crises;83 whether the president can keep secrets from
79
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Congress;84 and whether the president and other executive officials enjoy
immunities from prosecution for actions they undertake in the course of their
duties.85 I will discuss two of these controversies: the removal power and the
legislative veto.
1. The Removal Power
Presidents and their academic allies contend that the power to remove
executive branch officials is inherent in executive power. If the president cannot
remove officials who act contrary to the president’s wishes, then the president
cannot control that person, and thus cannot control the executive branch. Yet
Congress has, from time to time, placed various limits on the president’s power to
remove executive branch officials—notably, the for-cause restriction that was
approved in Morrison and the double for-cause restriction that was struck down in
Free Enterprise Fund.
As we saw earlier, the debate about the removal power has largely
proceeded along the lines dictated by the metaphor of the balance of power.
Critics of for-cause requirements, like Justice Scalia in his Morrison dissent,
argue that for-cause requirements tilt the balance of power in Congress’s favor,
while defenders, like Justice Breyer in his Free Enterprise Fund dissent, argue that
for-cause requirements do not upset the balance power.
It should now be clear that these claims about the effect of for-cause
requirements on the balance of power are nearly impossible to evaluate. Scalia’s
argument entails that the for-cause requirement will cause some significant
portion of political outcomes to move away from the president’s ideal point and
toward Congress’ ideal point. It is not clear that this is so—conceivably, the
independent counsel could increase the president’s power by creating a greater
risk of sanction for wayward executive agents who violate the law where the
president does not want them to.86 Indeed, President Carter backed and signed the
Ethics in Government Act,87 which created the independent counsel statute; he
may well have believed that presidential power would increase if the public’s
confidence in the presidency could be repaired after Watergate. On this view, the
persist past the emergency); cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating
Emergencies, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 605, 614–620 (2003) (arguing that expanded executive power
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statute increases the president’s vertical power (his ability to ensure that agents
implement his policies), which may make up for any (possibly trivial) loss in
horizontal power.
Even if the independent counsel statute reduced the president’s power—
either absolutely or only relative to Congress’—the question is how much it
reduced his power, and it is difficult, probably impossible, to answer this
question. As Adrian Vermeule has recently pointed out, the extent to which an
agency is “independent,” in the sense of being able to make decisions that do not
follow the political interests of the executive, depends a great deal on political
context and public opinion.88 Some agencies that are nominally independent are in
fact sensitive to the president’s agenda, and other agencies that are nominally
non-independent are in fact able to deviate from the president’s agenda. For
example, the Bush administration suffered a political setback when it fired
lawyers in the non-independent Justice Department, suggesting that political
norms confer independence, of at least a sort, on that agency. 89 By contrast, the
National Labor Relations Board enjoys statutory independence but in fact is
highly politicized, according to Vermeule.90 Thus, if Congress passes a law that
restricts the president’s power over the Justice Department, it may weaken the
president excessively (and that may well be the final verdict on the independent
counsel statute, which was allowed to expire); while if Congress passes a law that
restricts the president’s power over the NLRB, it may improve the balance of
power. A court charged with maintaining the balance of power would need to be
attuned to this political context.
An even greater problem is the baseline problem. If the independent
counsel statute reduced the president’s horizontal power, was this reduction a
violation of the constitutional baseline or did it restore the balance of powers to
the appropriate constitutional baseline? Scalia is notably silent on this issue,
referring only to our “former constitutional system,”91 which may refer to the
system that existed just prior to the decision or the system at the founding, or the
system at some other time period. The problem for Scalia is that if the founding
provides the baseline, then surely the independent counsel statute is constitutional,
as nearly everyone agrees that the president is significantly more powerful
relative to Congress today, or in 1988, when the case was decided, than he was at
the time of the founding. If the baseline is instead the balance of power on the day
before the statute was enacted, the question is why that date should be the
baseline. As we saw above, the baseline problem seems to be insoluble.
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It is, of course, possible to argue for or against for-cause requirements on
policy grounds. One might criticize them on the grounds that bureaucrats who
cannot be disciplined by the president will produce worse policy outcomes than
bureaucrats who can be, presumably because the president is responsive to
democratic pressures.92 Or one might defend for-cause requirements on the
grounds that presidents cause agencies to produce outcomes that benefit favored
constituents rather than the public interest; only independence would enable
agencies to resist this pressure; and agency officials themselves care about the
public interest. Both of these arguments are theoretically coherent and amenable
to empirical testing, and it might turn out that some agencies should be
independent and others should not be.93
My point is thus not that arguments about administrative structure are
impossible to resolve. It is that such arguments should not take place through the
metaphor of the balance of power, which provides no guidance to courts or to
thinking in general, and obscure the issues at stake. It is hard to believe that the
balance of power idea actually explains the outcomes in the removal cases. If the
cases display any logic at all, they suggest a generalized suspicion of bureaucratic
innovation on the part of the Supreme Court, leading to a presumption against
such innovation unless the innovation is incremental and seems likely to improve
regulatory outcomes.94
2. The Legislative Veto
In INS v. Chadha,95 the Supreme Court struck down a statute that
authorized one house of Congress to veto a decision by the executive branch to
permit a removable alien to stay in the United States. The majority opinion held
that the statute violated presentment (because the veto is in effect legislation that
is not signed by the president) and bicameralism (because only one house need
approve a resolution invalidating the executive branch’s decision), and left it at
that. Justice Powell’s concurrence, however, argued that the legislative veto
should be struck down because it represents an excessive accumulation of power
in Congress (albeit judicial rather than executive power). 96 Justice White’s dissent
put even more emphasis on the balance of powers, but argued that the legislative
veto ensured that excessive authority was not put in the hands of the executive.
For example, “in the energy field, the legislative veto served to balance broad
92
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delegations in legislation emerging from the energy crisis of the 1970s.”97 Justice
White argued that the legislative veto was the mechanism that Congress used to
ensure that a balance of power remained between it and the executive despite the
massive delegations of authority to executive branch agencies that took place over
the course of the twentieth century. Invaliding the legislative veto, then, meant
that Congress would have no means of checking executive power, short of
refusing to delegate power in the first place.
Many academics took up this view. In the words of Professors Eskridge
and Ferejohn, “Chadha invalidated legislative veto provisions in hundreds of
federal statutes and was potentially far-reaching judicial activism, unsettling the
careful balance between the federal Legislative and Executive Branches.”98 Not
all academics agree with Eskridge and Ferejohn, or Justice White, that the
legislative veto is needed to maintain the balance of power, but the debate has in
large part focused on the question of how the legislative veto affects the balance
of power, with some arguing that the legislative veto excessively favors Congress
and others arguing that it does not.99
In an earlier paper on the legislative veto, Professors Eskridge and
Ferejohn employed the spatial model I described in Part III.A to defend Justice
White’s position.100 Eskridge and Ferejohn argue that under the original
understanding, Congress has greater influence on legislation than the executive
because of its role in approving legislation. The president’s veto power can be
used to block some legislation and influence other legislation on the margin
(which Congress writes to avoid the veto), but presidential influence is
nonetheless rather modest because Congress initiates legislation and can override
the veto. Thus, legislative outcomes will be closer to Congress’s ideal point than
to the President’s ideal point. Under the modern system of agency regulation,
however, the president has significantly greater influence on outcomes. Agencies
can issue rules, and the president appoints and typically can remove agency heads.
Although Congress can legislate in order to reverse rules that it does not like, an
agency that seeks to advance the president’s agenda will nonetheless be able to
enact rules that are closer to the president’s ideal point than to Congress’—the
97
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basic reason being that the power to initiate legislation, which greatly influences
the ultimate outcome, has shifted from Congress to the agency where regulatory
power has been delegated. Thus, we have an imbalance of power, one that
necessitates a corrective mechanism.
Eskridge and Ferejohn argue that in fact Congress has understood as
much, and implemented a corrective mechanism in the form of the legislative
veto—indeed, Congress put the legislative veto in hundreds of statutes. Because
the legislative veto enables Congress to invalidate an agency rule without
obtaining the president’s consent, it can rein in the agencies, and force them to
implement rules closer to Congress’ ideal point. Thus, consistent with the
understanding of the founders, the policy outcome is more closely aligned with
Congress’ ideal point than with the president’s, even if the institutional structure
differs.
The whole argument is puzzling. Eskridge and Ferejohn show that the
legislative veto to some extent “offsets” additional power transferred to the
executive in the administrative state, but they ignore all the other ways in which
constitutional and political developments have affected the “balance” between the
branches. The executive also obtained power relative to Congress as a result of
the advance of communications technology. According to Eskridge and
Ferejohn’s logic, that imbalance would justify further constraints—say, a onehouse veto, which, however, Eskridge and Ferejohn firmly reject. The executive
also has more employees at its disposal, and a greater budget. Surely those
developments affect the balance of power as well. Or one could argue that the
courts have in the last decade usurped the executive’s power by exerting control
over combat operations,101 justifying any effort by the executive to seize some
judicial powers. For all the sophistication of their method, the Eskridge and
Ferejohn argument has an air of unreality—as though the branches were engaging
in gymnastic maneuvers in a vacuum rather than responding to public opinion,
parties, and the media.
And then there is the baseline problem. Eskridge and Ferejohn
acknowledge that there is no reason to use the founding-era balance of powers as
the baseline for determining the constitutionality of the legislative veto.102 We
may instead think that the president should today have a greater influence on
policy outcomes than at the founding. One could give a number of reasons.
Today, the president is elected; at the founding he was not. Today, Congress is
larger and more diverse than it was at the founding, possibly interfering with
internal deliberation and coordination and producing worse policy outcomes.
Today, the national government has much greater responsibilities, requiring quick
101
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and even continuous reactions to changing events—something Congress is
institutionally incapable of providing. The president has a national constituency;
during the Founding, and up until the Civil War, people were more inclined to
think of the nation as a collectivity of states rather than as a single national
population, justifying greater influence for Congress. But then if we accept these
reasons for rejecting the founding-era baseline as we must, we do not know what
baseline should be used.
Another problem with Eskridge and Ferejohn’s argument is that it assumes
without any evidence that the legislative veto actually gives Congress any
power.103 Fear of executive branch retaliation may cause Congress not to threaten
to use legislative vetoes, or to threaten to use them only sparingly. Or Congress
may have additional methods for influencing policy outcomes. It can write more
detailed statutes; it can threaten to withhold funds; it can harass agency officials
or conversely shield them from the influence of the executive with for-cause
protections. Or, alternatively, perhaps the ability to enact legislative vetoes causes
Congress to delegate excessively; a prohibition on legislative vetoes (like the
nondelegation doctrine itself, which Eskridge and Ferejohn support) may make
Congress more reluctant to confer power on the executive. Indeed, Eskridge and
Ferejohn suggests that Congress can respond to the invalidation of the legislative
veto by delegating less, in which case the legislative veto will not upset the
balance of power.
It is quite difficult to say what the effect of the invalidation of the
legislative veto might have on the balance of powers; and even if one can describe
the effect with any degree of confidence, it is even harder to say whether the
resulting balance of powers is constitutional or not. It would be best to do without
the balance of powers metaphor altogether, and look for an alternative means for
evaluating reforms of institutional structure.
C. An Alternative
If the balance of powers is not a useful organizing principle for thinking
about government, what is the alternative? Let us for the moment bracket the role
of courts (which I will return to in Section D), and ask how scholars and
policymakers should think about government structure. The now-standard
approach is to rely on principal-agent models, which are ubiquitous in the
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political science and economics literatures on government structure,104 and have
made some inroads in legal scholarship. The principal-agent model provides a
simple framework for asking questions about the optimal structure of government.
The literature is vast and cannot be summarized here, but a few comments
are appropriate. In a principal-agent model, as applied to government structure,
we conceive of the public as the principal and the government as the agent. The
role of the government is to take actions that benefit the public according to some
normative criterion such as welfare maximization or satisfaction of the preference
of the median voter. Electoral institutions are justified because they provide a
means for the public to select leaders whose ideal points are similar to those of the
public, and to punish leaders (by refusing to reelect them) who select policy
outcomes that differ from those that benefit the public. Constitutional rights are
justified because in some circumstances leaders would otherwise use their power
to weaken electoral institutions or exploit those who are out of power.
Independent bodies are needed because leaders lack incentives to enforce laws
that undermine their power. Thus, many of the major features of American
political institutions can be fit easily into the principle-agent framework.
The principal-agent model also provides guidance for answering more
fine-grained questions such as whether the president’s power to remove a
subordinate should be subject to a for-cause standard. If the president’s ideal point
is aligned with the public’s, then the for-cause standard will produce worse
outcomes than a discretionary standard, as it enables the agent to satisfy her own
preferences rather than those of the public. If the president’s ideal point is not
aligned with the public’s, then the for-cause standard may improve political
outcomes, although we would still need to address how close the agent’s ideal
point is aligned with the public’s (including whether Congress would have more
influence over the agent and would also use that influence to drive the agent
closer to or farther from the public’s ideal point).
This type of evaluation is clearly difficult because the answer depends on
empirical data that will rarely be available and so people will need to rely on
crude empirical conjectures. But it avoids any reliance on unhelpful notions of the
balance of power. Indeed, I suspect that agency models will tend to undermine the
Madisonian idea because it is hard to justify, from a principal-agent perspective, a
goal of maintaining a balance of power among multiple agents—as opposed to
assigning them functions to which their expertise suits them. A recent paper by
Jide Nzelibe and Matthew Stephenson, for example, presents a model of
separation of powers that in fact undermines it by suggesting that the president
should have the option to obtain congressional acquiescence to his projects but
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not be compelled to do so.105 Other papers have attempted to model separation of
powers in such a way as to show that it may advance the public interest, but even
in these papers the notion of balance plays no role.106
D. The Role of Courts
One of the peculiarities of the balance of powers doctrine is that it started
off in Madison’s mind as a description of the equilibrium in which the three
branches would hold themselves,107 but today it has become a rule that the court
uses to adjudicate disputes between Congress and the president and on occasion to
resist incursions into its own domain.108 But Madison treated the judiciary as no
less eager to expand its power than the two other branches. On Madisonian
premises, we should be suspicious of the Supreme Court’s insistence that it is a
neutral adjudicator as between the political branches. The Court may be more
akin to the offshore balancer in realist international relations theory, which
intervenes on the side of the weaker of two rival countries in order to ensure that
they remain eternally locked in conflict and no threat to the balancer itself. The
Court maintains balance not to ensure the optimal form of government, still less to
maintain the constitutional plan, but just to ensure that neither branch becomes so
powerful as to pose a threat to its prerogatives.
In any event, under current doctrine courts take an active role in resolving
disputes about separation of powers, frequently relying as we have discussed on
the metaphor of the balance of power, and at other times on more formalistic
ideas about the allocation of powers.109 Some scholars believe that courts should
use the political question doctrine to avoid resolving separation of powers
questions on grounds of institutional competence.110 As long as courts continue to
employ the balance of powers analysis, this argument is a sound one. Because
there is no reliable way to use the balance of powers metaphor to resolve
separation of powers questions in a socially desirable way, courts can produce no
social benefit by involving themselves in these disputes.
Suppose, however, that courts used conventional agency models to resolve
separation of powers disputes. One might be more optimistic about the
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consequences of adjudication because at least courts would be using a reliable
method, one that lends itself to empirical analysis. However, it is far from clear
that courts should involve themselves in what are essentially policy questions
about the optimal role of government structure. They do not have any expertise in
these matters, which are not legal questions at all.
One might respond with worries that if courts are not involved,
constitutional values embodied in the separation of powers—which, recall, were
intended to prevent “tyranny”—would be overridden by the political branches.
But these worries are exaggerated. The literature on separation of powers is
distinguished by the lack of connection between theory and practice. Congress is
supposed to be self-aggrandizing, yet it has continuously delegated power to the
executive for more than a half century. The judiciary, too, has largely deferred to
the executive in administrative matters and foreign policy. For all the talk about
an “imperial presidency,” there has been no serious political effort to withdraw
powers from the executive since the early 1970s. The legal literature seems
incapable of understanding that competition between the parties, not the branches
of government, provides the main constraint on government today.111 A more
realistic account of the development of U.S. government structure is simply that
Congress, the judiciary, and the executive have by and large worked together
through the party system to transform an eighteenth-century government structure
into a modern government structure, probably responding jointly to popular
pressure for a government that is capable of implementing popular policies.
Thus, it is tempting to conclude that courts should invoke the political
question doctrine whenever appointments issues or possibly any separation-ofpowers issues arise.112 Another approach, equally good in my view, would be for
courts simply to enforce whatever statute Congress enacts on the grounds that the
judiciary should not strike down a statute unless it has reason to believe that it is
harmful in some way. Given that Congress has shown no reluctance to grant
authority to the executive over the last sixty years, this judicial approach would
not likely have any negative implications for presidential power.
Conclusion
The balance of powers metaphor has had a good run but it is time to put it
to rest. It provides no practical guidance to courts when they adjudicate disputes
between branches; nor does it reflect any reasonable constitutional goal. We
might agree with Madison that all government powers should not be located in a
single individual or group of magistrates, but once we rule out this extreme
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outcome, the concept of “balance” is too vague and slippery to serve as a
workable rule.
It also distracts from the central question of optimal government structure.
The reason we should care about, say, constraints on the removal power is not that
those constraints upset some balance between Congress and the president. The
reason is that those constraints may improve or worsen the performance of the
bureaucracy. To determine whether they do, one must consider the particular
body in question and ask why the constraints might be useful or harmful. Is this
body likely to be captured by industry? Is it likely to be used for partisan
purposes? In answering these questions, one should look at the history of the body
(if there is any) and other elements of its structure. For example, an agency that is
staffed by highly trained professionals with a narrowly defined mission might be
less susceptible to industry capture; and an agency that can be manipulated so as
to improve the president’s reelection prospects might be more susceptible to
partisan abuse. As a result, most countries give independence to the central bank,
as has the United States—and there is no need to worry about whether doing so
upsets the balance of power between the branches. For other agencies, tradeoffs
point in different directions, resulting in various optimal levels of independence.
Again, balance plays no role in the analysis. Finally, in cases where the executive
claims the power to violate laws, or not to defend those laws in courts, or to
modify appropriations or impound founds—the question again is whether
outcomes are likely to be better if the executive can act without congressional
consent or not. One might believe that in some cases the answer is yes (for
example, congressional micromanaging of military operations) and in other cases
no (for example, impoundment or line-item vetoes) without also being required to
take a position as to whether these views are consistent with some overriding
balance. Policy experts already know this; it is time that judges and law professors
learn it too.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Eric Posner
University of Chicago Law School
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